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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OREM CITY, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. Case No. 9400318-CA 
CHRISTOPHER J. SOLOMON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred by Section 78-2a-3(f), U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court err in concluding that Defendant 
was given a sufficient warning of the consequences of allowing a 
blood draw to satisfy constitutional and statutory requirements? 
The standard of review as to a lower court's 
determination of the interpretation of a statute as 
it relates to the admission of evidence is that an 
appellate court accords the lower court's 
interpretation no particular deference but assesses 
it for correctness as any other conclusion of law. 
Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah 
1990). 
The lower court ruled as to this issue on page 
27 of the Motion to Suppress Hearing dated April 14, 
1994. 
2. Did the lower court err in ruling that Defendant had 
knowingly consented to a blood draw? 
Findings of Fact supporting a trial court's 
decision on a Motion to Suppress are reviewed under 
the "clearly erroneous" standard of Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 52A. State v. Hargraves, 806 
P.2d 228, 231 (Utah App. 1991). 
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The lower court ruled that the government had 
reasonable grounds to believe that it had obtained 
Defendant's consent on page 37 of the suppression 
hearing dated April 14, 1994. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution..."No 
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution..."Every 
person shall be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12, "The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself." 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14, "A person shall 
be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures." 
Section 41-6-44.10: 
1(a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state 
is considered to have given his consent to a chemical 
test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, for the 
purpose of determining whether he was operating or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 
having a blood or alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4 while 
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
combination of alcohol in any drug under Section 
41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled 
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in 
the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, 
if the test is or tests are administered at the 
direction of a peace officer having grounds to 
believe that person to have been operating or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 
having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4.... 
2(a) If a person has been placed under arrest, has 
then been requested by a peace officer to submit to 
any one or more of the chemical tests under 
subsection 1, and refuses to submit to any chemical 
test requested, the person shall be warned by the 
peace officer requesting the test or tests that a 
refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in 
revocation of the person's license to operate a motor 
vehicle. 
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(b) Following the warning under subsection (a), if 
the person does not immediately request that the 
chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer 
be administered a peace officer shall serve on the 
person, on behalf of the Driver's License Division, 
immediate notice of the Driver's License Division to 
revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a 
motor vehicle.... 
* * * 
8. If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a 
chemical test or tests under the provisions of this 
section, evidence of refusal shall be admissible in 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising 
out of acts alleged to have been committed while the 
person was driving or in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or 
any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug. 
Section 53-3-223, U.C.A.: 
1(a). If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to 
believe that a person may be violating or has 
violated Section 41-6-44, prohibiting the operation 
of a vehicle with a certain blood or breath alcohol 
concentration and driving under the influence of any 
drug, alcohol, or combination of a drug and alcohol 
or while having any measurable controlled substance 
or metabolite of a controlled substance in the 
person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, the 
peace officer may, in connection with arresting the 
person, request that the person submit to a chemical 
test or tests to be administered in compliance with 
the standards under Section 41-6-44.10. 
* * * 
2. The peace officer shall advise a person prior to 
the person's submissiion to a chemical test that a 
test result indicating a violation of Section 41-6-44 
or 41-6-44.6 shall, and the existence of a blood 
alcohol content sufficient to render the person 
incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle may, 
result in suspension or revocation of the person's 
license to drive a motor vehicle. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the denial by the lower court of 
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Defendant's Motion to Suppress the evidence of the blood alcohol 
content of a test administered to Defendant while he was 
hospitalized after an accident and his subsequent conviction 
based on the blood sample. 
Course of Proceedings 
A Motion to Suppress was held on April 14, 1994 before the 
Honorable Joseph Dimick. The arresting officer as well as the 
defendant testified. The lower court denied Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress. The Defendant was convicted on April 25, 1994 of 
driving while intoxicated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant Christopher Solomon was involved in an 
automobile accident on January 24, 1994. Officer Scott Newrem 
of the Orem City Police investigated the accident. He found Mr. 
Solomon seated in the driver's seat of the defendant's Celica. 
He was bleeding from a couple of wounds on his face. 
(Suppression Hearing, April 14, 1994, pp. 4-5; hereinafter 
Suppression Hearing). He testified that he smelled a strong 
odor of alcoholic beverage in the vehicle. (Id. at 5). 
He stated that when he arrived at the hospital he also 
smelled a strong odor of alcoholic beverage. While at the 
hospital he informed the defendant that he was being arrested 
for driving under the influence of alcohol. (Id. at 6). The 
officer did not give the defendant any type of field test 
because he did not feel he was able to perform them safely. 
(Id. at 8). 
Because the officer did not have a DUI report form with him 
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he attempted to explain Utah's implied consent law from memory. 
(Id. at 8). He told the defendant: 
Basically the same as they're written in the 
admonition on the back of the report form, that he 
does have the right to refuse, if he does this, his 
license can be revoked for one year without a 
provision for a limited license. That a result 
indicating .08 or greater could result in the denial 
of his license for three months. (Id. at 9). 
The officer stated that he understood that the defendant 
was fairly deaf but that he felt he was able to communicate with 
him if he spoke directly to him so that the defendant could read 
his lips. (Id.). At that time he handed the defendant a 
"consent form" which stated, "I have granted permission for 
blood samples to be taken." This was signed by the defendant in 
the officer's presence. (Id. at 10). After this form was 
signed, he watched a registered nurse draw blood from the 
defendant. 
On cross examination the officer admitted that he wrote 
down in his report that the defendant was "mute" and not "deaf". 
The officer testified he used this word because it was the only 
one he could think of to "demonstrate that he was a—he had a 
problem communicating or understanding." (Id. at 13). Defense 
counsel asked the following question which was answered by the 
officer: 
Q. So it was your perception the next day that Mr. 
Solomon's main problem was communicating with 
speech? 
A. I think there was, yeah, there was a definite 
communication problem. (Id. at 13). 
The officer stated that he commonly read what is known as 
the "Refusal Admonition" to everyone whether they refused or 
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not. The officer testified that after he gave the warning the 
best he could, that Mr. Solomon indicated it was okay to take 
the test by making a verbal response like "okay" and shaking his 
head yes. (Id. at 16). 
The defendant Christopher Solomon testified that while he 
was at the hospital, he did not understand anything that the 
officer was telling him. (Id. at 40}. As to the signed card he 
stated, "I thought it was some type of form that the nurse 
needed to draw blood for typing, testing, whatever." He stated 
that, "I had no idea what the blood samples were going to be 
used for." (Id. at 43). He stated that the form was handed to 
him by the nurse and not by the officer. (Id.). 
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the lower 
court denied Defendant's motions on all grounds and allowed the 
blood evidence to be admitted into trial. 
On April 25, 1994 the Court found the defendant guilty of 
driving while intoxicated based upon the results of the blood 
draw. The Court fined the defendant $1,000 and six months in 
jail but stayed imposition pending appeal and further review. 
On May 19, 1994 this appeal was taken from the April 14, 
1994 Suppression Hearing and the Judgment of April 25, 1994. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. It is the contention of the defendant that the lower 
court erred in failing to suppress the evidence of the blood 
alcohol test obtained from the defendant while in the hospital. 
It is defendant's contention that he was not sufficiently warned 
under existing Utah criminal law and civil law as to the 
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consequences of allowing the ul --•"* -aw LO be LdKen u e 
consequences in refusing the bl *™ *asica"ny ^fendant 
asserts that undei : the criminal law . • Defendant may 
incarcerated from conviction 01 a ax s ' 
offense, that he was en- ed *-^  K^ nformed tha -••-*• * •: 
required to allow the taking '- . ;• l -v -.nnce such would be 
i urn in 11II c c 11 111 i n i.in.1 i KII • 1.1. 
incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure and that he 
should also have been informed that should he so refuse such 
r - nil ni 
Defendant should have had explained In In HI the differences 
betwee: • : <- ••- standard ^ losing his license ~ind the 
c • I 11 mi! i mi v v in i>] a t d i : 
2. Defendant further contends u,at the lower court erred 
in factuallv i inding that the defendant had knowingly consented 
that the officer 'ailed ' • J? - ^ e statutory warnings a-
contained in the DUI manuax, LLLCLL ue signed a document whir 
a .1 mi i in I I  r h i Hi WHS not meant for prosecution •?« r "' -.^ r* , 
and that the officer himself admit'—-: thai there -a ,• 
communication problem between the iwu of them. Und* I 
ci" 1111 Hid I I «i i » Del eii'iant was not required, to give his consent for 
a blood draw without being ful 1 y informed >f the consequences of 
such consent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS GIVEN A SUFFICIENT WARNING 
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OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALLOWING A BLOOD 
DRAW TO SATISFY CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS. 
The present maze of drunk driving laws in Utah present a 
confusing and often unintelligible path of civil and criminal 
procedure. Under the present statutory situation, it is a crime 
punishable by fine and imprisonment to drive while intoxicated 
in Utah. An additional punishment under the criminal law upon 
conviction can be the removal of a defendant's driving license 
for a specified period of time. 
Concurrently with the criminal case, a civil case also 
develops. With this statutory scheme, a driver who is 
determined by an administrative law judge to have been incapable 
of safely operating a vehicle or whose blood alcohol content was 
.08 or greater, also will lose their license for a specified 
period of time depending upon their prior record. If a 
defendant refuses to take a breath test then the civil law 
provides that the driver will automatically lose his license for 
a specified period of time regardless of whether he was actually 
intoxicated or not and regardless of the outcome of the criminal 
case. 
This dual system of criminal and civil procedure is not 
only confusing to lawyers, judges, and other officials working 
in the system each day, but certainly to drivers who are stopped 
and confronted with accusations of unlawful intoxication. As 
such, therefore, it is imperative that accused drivers are given 
every opportunity to understand the consequences of their 
actions or inaction in both the criminal and civil proceedings. 
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As the Utah Supreme Cour* &aia ±n ±^, ? 
Fairness and due process requires that a person 
threatened with the loss of his driver's s license 
should . afforded an opportunity to make a choice 
based on a fair explanation of his rights and duties. 
Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah 1979). 
Certainly, i f due process protects a defendant from the loss of 
his license, :i t a 3 s o p r o t e c t s h :i m f r o in i x I c a r c e r a t i on, and f i n e • 
I :: r :i it :i i i a 1! ::: :: i:i t e x t :i t :i s e 1 e m e i:i t a r y t h a t o n c e a 
suspected drivei • :ii s arrested he or she must be given a Miranda 
warning. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court 
[W]hen a driver suspected of driving under 
the influence is arrested, he is at that point 
involved in a criminal proceeding and must be given 
the Miranda warning if his subsequent statements 
are to be admitted in a criminal proceeding against 
him. Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979). 
Ii * suppress! ^ hearing the burden f p*-n? - t .^  the 
s:
 : 3 
consent for seizure under * Fourth Amendment. State v. 
Sterzer, 808 P.2d 122, 127 \Utdh App. 1991); Suppression 
Hearing, p 3 . 
In the instant case, the state failed to introduce *\,Y 
evidence that at tiic time of Mr. Solomon's arrest he was yiven 
the Miranda warning. Sinee there is no evidence that it was 
given, ' • assumed under the burden of proof standard 
that JLL was nut yiven. Cxecii an arrested driver has the 
right- to refuse t-o qive anv ~ riminating statements to a pi.... . ce 
offi ?ei after t : : arrest and failure to •-•:• the Miranda 
wan *.; c'lern . ibsequent st *. T!IP II \\. 
Supreme Court the Miranda case stated ...-?•. before being 
interrogated a person must be informed that _<_ has the right to 
remain silent and that any statements made may be used against 
him. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
Thus, when the criminal context of a DUI is analyzed, the 
defendant may refuse to give any incriminating evidence against 
himself as to the condition of his alleged alcoholic 
intoxication. In order to obtain a blood sample against a 
suspected drunk driver, the officer must either obtain the 
consent of the driver or obtain a warrant from a court 
permitting an involuntary blood draw. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 
U.S. 291 (1973). Since there was clearly no attempt to obtain 
a warrant in this case, the state relied upon the argument that 
the defendant voluntarily consented to the blood draw and 
therefore that the evidence obtained was proper. Defendant 
contends that the factual evidence existing in the record does 
not support the state's argument and that the lower court erred 
in finding that a voluntary consent had occurred. This issue 
will be discussed infra in Point II of this Brief. 
In the criminal context of this case it is Defendant's 
contetion that he should have been given the Miranda warning, 
which he was not, and that furthermore, he should have been 
given a warning that if he submitted to a blood draw and if the 
blood draw showed an alcoholic content of .08 and above, that 
such evidence could be used to convict him under the criminal 
statute and subject him to imprisonment and a fine. 
Furthermore, due process required that if he chose to refuse to 
take such a blood draw that he should be warned that such 
refusal itself could be used against him in a criminal 
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p - t-.: ..ng p"ii irsuant to section '• -44. JLU U . -
The Utah Supreme Court in Smith v. Cox . . : . HA I Utah 
198C discussed the distinction between the .vy-:".).iaj and civil 
s ----- in i n Hili T 1 11= • C o i ii 1 : noted that while a defendant had a 
constitutional right : not to gi ve evidence against himseli il it 
is used in a criminal oroceedin*. * *r • * 
c 
highway and that this ; . : -,-iv subject conditions. 
This distinction between -* iminal - ^notions is 
of tei i ] c: 'St i in iits.es 
concerning civil liabiliiv - drivers :< rise suspension 
considered a substitite * * * criminal arnings and 
r, 
Uta* nstant case, the officer testified that : 
his -•• versic * statutory warnings required by Sections 
5J-J--224C!) audi 41 i» 44 1 M2A) . The firsl is 1:1 le c I v i I! statute 
advising a person tha* : * .* rubral t to i blood alcohol test, 
they may lose theii se to d r i V e a motor v el:i:i cle. The 
second states tj <=»rc™ refuses to submit to such test, 
he may also ] os* • icense. While both of these warnings 
relate to the ci * -' : "1 :i cense suspension, neither 
relates to th<?» criminal warnings of :f:l ne and imprisonment. 
The Utah Supreme Court on two occasions recognized t • 
c i" 1111 11 s i u i in i" a I mi11 11 I i" I I i- . 11 * |,) 1 i i 111 111 iinii, : • f ill: II: i e • c i: :i : 1 
laws at the lime ol an arrest, See Muir v. Cox, 
P. 2d 384 (Utah 1 9 8 0 ) ; and Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 
(111 .il*! I * 1 "I I I ! II I I In-! i" t.Mses wei a Il lie ) > > 
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DUI scheme and do not address the problem involved in failing to 
give warnings on the criminal side. 
Defendant contends that even if it is assumed that the 
officer in this case correctly informed him that he could have 
his license suspended if a .08 or greater alcohol content was 
discovered, and that he would have his license suspended if he 
refused to take the appropriate tests, such warning by itself is 
insufficient to allow the blood test into evidence on the 
criminal side of the matter. 
The Supreme Court of Utah stated that after a person is 
arrested he is then compelled to elect whether he will submit to 
a chemical test or lose his license. State v. Cruz, 446 
P.2d 307, 309 (1968). While this is a correct statement as to 
the civil liability of license suspension, it is incomplete as 
to the criminal counterpart. As stated in Holman, supra, 
an explanation must give the defendant a fair opportunity to 
make meaningful decisions based upon a sufficient explanation of 
rights and duties. 
In the instant case, the evidence is insufficient, as a 
matter of law, to show that defendant was properly warned in the 
criminal context. Defendant should have been given a Miranda 
warning at the time of his arrest in the hospital. At that 
point, he should also have been informed that if he consented to 
a blood draw that such evidence could be used to suspend his 
license and could be used in a criminal conviction. 
Furthermore, he should have been informed that if he elected to 
refuse to give such a test, he would probably lose his license 
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for a period of t:I me arid t ha t such refusal could be used in a 
criminal trial against him II a d t h i s I > * M • i < J *»11 < < , I d s s i J 111111 g 
Defendant heard and understood the wan-J* ;- Defendant could 
have then made a meaningful decision whether he wished to 
risk the crimina 1 conviction or facf suspens:i oi 1 of 1 :i : , 
license. To requi re a warning i • :.t - : . scheme without 
mention of the criminal scheme denxes tne defendant of due 
process and causes the confusion that the Supreme Court in its 
earlier decisions wi shed to a^  : •/: 
The lower < * 
the blood test < .<• ia , Defendant was .* ,iVdi proper 
warnings as required by constitutional and statutory law. 
POINT II 
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT PROPER WARNINGS 
WERE GIVEN TO THE DEFENDANT, THE LOWER 
COURT NEVERTHELESS ERRED IN RULING THAT 
THE DEFENDANT HAD KNOWINGLY CONSENTED TO 
A BLOOD DRAW. 
Under both the criminal ax id civil schemes it is essentia] 
tha* person accused drunk driving knowingly consents to any 
a
 samp-^es^ "The question whether a 
consent to a search was • i n fa< ::1 : 'voluntar - -. > the product 
of duress or* coercion, express r .mplied is a question t fact 
t ' l I l>H lI'H I (Ml 111 II, tl'IMll .- ' i e C 1 U ' > " *,; -r- " 
State v. Marshall, 2d 880, 887 (Utah App I990) (quoting 
Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 4i. * , 21 8 I L973). This Court has 
held that the state must meet its burden f * voluntary consent 
by showing: (] ) el ear and positive testimony that the consent 
was "unequivocal a n d s p e c i f i c " r imi " f nr *M-> I d i n I i 1 1 e I L1 n e m i 1 y 
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given"; (2) that consent was given without duress or coercion, 
express or implied; and (3) because the courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights, there must be convincing evidence that 
such rights were waived. Id. at 127. 
If the defendant refused to consent to a blood draw, there 
is no question that he could have lost his license under the 
civil scheme of Utah law. However, absent the obtaining of a 
warrant, the officer could not have drawn the blood against the 
defendant's will. As such, therefore, in order for this 
evidence to be admissible in a criminal prosecution, it must be 
shown that the defendant voluntarily consented to the blood draw 
in spite of any consequences on the civil side. 
The evidence is undisputed that the defendant had a severe 
hearing problem and in fact could be classified as deaf. The 
officer himself stated that there was a severe communication 
problem between them and that he assumed if he spoke to the 
defendant directly, he could read his lips. There was no 
evidence showing that the defendant had the ability to read the 
officer's lips or that the officer's assumption was reasonable 
at the time of the arrest and request for blood draw in light of 
defendant's hospitalization. The defendant was not shown any 
written documents as is normally the case in a DUI arrest where 
the warnings and various other information is contained in the 
DUI forms. The officer, in fact, had to rely upon his own 
memory to give the civil warnings to the defendant. The consent 
form for the blood draw did not state it would be used in any 
-14-
criminal or civil proceeding, but was in fact the type of form 
that would be used by any hospital for any blood draw for any 
reason. 
The testimony of the defendant was that he did not 
understand what was being told to him by the officer because he 
was unable to hear him clearly and that he believed the form he 
signed was one to help him in his treatment for the injuries of 
the accident. Both the officer's testimony and that of 
Defendant is at best a showing of no consent and at worst a 
showing of confusion and ambiguity. The lower court was 
required to objectively view the evidence to determine if a 
voluntary consent had been made by Defendant in light of these 
circumstances. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Muir v. Cox, 611 P.2d 384 
(Utah 1980), in a concurring opinion by Justice Stewart, stated 
the standard to be applied in determining whether an officer had 
properly given the statutory warnings under the civil statutes 
justifying the suspension of a license. The Court stated: 
When there is apparent confusion arising from a 
failure of an arrestee to understand the demand for a 
blood test and the rights accorded under a Miranda 
warning, the officer must give a clear explanation of 
the duties and rights of the arrestee. An officer 
properly discharges his duty if he gives an 
explanation that a person of reasonable intelligence, 
who is in command of his senses, would understand. 
Id. at 386. 
But in the instant case, the defendant was not "in command 
of his senses" in that he could not hear as a normal person 
could." It was incumbent upon the state to show that it had gone 
to extreme measures to insure that the defendant understood what 
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rights and liabilities were involved with the consent that was 
being requested. 
The lower court ruled that "the government thought they had 
actual consent." (Suppression Hearing, 37). The Court 
misconstrued the burden. The question was whether or not 
viewing the evidence in its totality it could be said that the 
defendant understood the consent that he was asked to give; not 
whether the officer believed the defendant understood. 
To allow such a ruling to stand would negate the 
effort required by law enforcement officials to clearly make 
sure that a defendant understands the request for consent. When 
a person has been involved in an accident, is old, or otherwise 
has a handicap, it is incumbent upon the government to show that 
a reasonable person with similar handicaps would have understood 
the warnings and would have voluntarily given such consent. It 
is immaterial what the officer believed of the defendant's 
understanding at the time the request was being made. This is a 
question of consent—not probable cause. 
For these reasons, therefore, even if it is assumed that 
the warnings were properly given to the defendant, the lower 
court erred in factually finding that the defendant had 
voluntarily consented to the blood draw. Therefore, the 
evidence of such draw should have been excluded by the lower 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
The creation of a civil statutory scheme by the legislature 
to suspend licenses of potentially dangerous drivers is 
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legitimate. However, this civil system is not a substitute for 
the protection given to all criminal defendants under the state 
and federal constitutions. Defendant was entitled to a clear 
explanation and warning under the criminal system if he was to 
be able to make an intelligent decision concerning testing of 
his blood. The police failed to properly inform defendant 
before the blood draw and therefore its results must be 
suppressed. 
The question of voluntary consent to the blood draw was 
distorted by the trial court. This was not a probable cause 
hearing to determine if the officer reasonably believed 
defendant had given his consent for the blood draw. Instead, 
the focus should have been on the objective state of mind of the 
defendant at the time he was requested to consent to the draw. 
Would a reasonable person in defendant's circumstances have 
voluntarily given their consent or would the hearing impairment, 
lack of written documentation and use of ambiguous hospital 
forms prevented any consent from being voluntary and knowing? 
Under both of the above arguments, the Court erred in 
failing to suppress the blood test results. The matter should 
be reversed and remanded. 
DATED this 27th day of February, 1995. 
3645 East 3100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
LARRY LONG 
225 North State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
-17-
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to Ed Berkovich, Orem City Prosecutor, 56 North 
State, Orem, Utah 84057, and Larry Long, 225 North State Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103-4615 this 27th day of February, 1995, 
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ADDENDUM 
Orem Dept. - 4th Circuit Court 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
CASE NO: 945000780 
DOB 
TAPE 
DATE 
CITATION 
02/09/57 
. 94195 COUNT 
04/29/94 
/ 
CITY OF OREM CITY 
VS 
SOLOMON, CHRISTOPHER 
663 E 485 S 
OREM UT 84058 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 41-6-44 DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Bench 
Fine: 1000.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 180 DA Susp: 0 ACS: 
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS: 
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
Fine Description: Surcharge - 85% 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS: 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
184 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Due: 
Due: 
Due: 
540.55 
459.45 
1,000.00 
SOLOMON, CHRISTOPHER CASE NO: 945000780 PAGE 2 
DOCKET INFORMATION: 
Sentence: 
Deft present with Counsel, Prosecutor present 
ATD: LONG, LARRY N. PRO: BERKOVICH, EDWARD 
Tape: 94195 Count: 184 
Judge: Joseph I. Dimick 
Chrg: DUI Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Be 
Fine Amount: 1000.00 Suspended: .00 
Jail: 180 DAYS Suspended: 
ALL PARTIES PRESENT. FINE OF $1000 AND 6 MONTHS JAIL ALL STAYED 
PENDING REVIEW ON JUNE 6, 1S94 AT 10:00 A.M. 
BY THE COURTS 
5GE, 'CIRCUIT COURT ^5 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 3 0 DAYS'.'-.., 
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT. 
